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A LegAL StAndArd for PoSt-CoLoniAL LAnd 
reform
by Amelia Chizwala Peterson*
[T]he increase of lands, and the right employing of 
them, is the great art of government: and that prince, 
who shall be so wise and godlike, as by established 
laws of liberty to secure protection and encouragement 
to the honest industry of mankind, against oppression 
of power and narrowness or party, will quickly be too 
hard for his neighbor…”
—John Locke1
We live in a world of globalizing processes that impose 
particular limitations on any one State’s capacity to do 
as it pleases under the cloak of sovereign independence, 
particularly in economic and human rights matters.”
—Ben Chigara2
IntroductIon
The violent land redistribution program of a small sub-Saharan country made international headlines twelve years ago before quickly bowing off the world stage.3 
Thousands of violently displaced Zimbabwean farmers were 
forced to settle into new lives in neighboring African countries, 
either as refugee immigrants or as hopeful exiles holding on to a 
desire that they would one day resume their livelihood as farm-
ers in their home country.4 The agrarian economy they once sup-
ported had crashed and hundreds of thousands of workers were 
displaced.5 Today, a grave, unaddressed question lingers in the 
psyche of our ordered society—what happens to property rights 
in the context of post-colonial land redistribution?
Post-colonial land reform is a necessity,6 but its design and 
implementation invoke questions about the bounds of govern-
ment authority to reshape the idea of the individual right to 
property, an issue traditionally left to domestic governance under 
the principles of sovereignty.7 Over the last decade, scholars 
scathingly condemned Zimbabwe’s fast track land reform, citing 
violations of human rights and property law.8 Yet, property rights 
in the context of post-colonial land redistribution have never 
been fully articulated,9 and no comprehensive standard has been 
offered to appraise post-colonial governments’ land reform poli-
cies, which are constrained by international norms.10
This article identifies a conceptual gap in the traditional 
(both classical and customary) justifications for property rights 
in the context of correcting colonially established land imbal-
ances, and proposes a legal standard based on five core elements 
extracted from human rights law and universally accepted 
international norms concerning property. To be legal under 
international norms, a land reform policy must: (1) stem from 
a legitimate public purpose; (2) be in accordance with law; 
(3) be proportional to the public purpose; (4) guarantee a non-
discriminatory right to own land; and (5) compensate incumbent 
landowners where elements of the formula are violated.11 The 
land reform formula proposed here is grounded in first genera-
tion civil and political human rights, making it a practical stan-
dard for any country to adopt, regardless of its level of economic 
and institutional development.
Land rights are not directly protected as human rights, 
although they are occasionally mentioned by human rights 
instruments.12 The bulk of human rights law establishes no 
other criteria in order for a claimant to qualify as an intended 
beneficiary of the law; protection of rights attaches simply by 
virtue of the claimant being human.13 However, while many 
intuitively believe that both those who have enjoyed access to 
property rights in land and those who have been marginalized 
and prevented by law from enjoying those rights should have 
some protected property rights under the new regime, the nature 
of the right—particularly the property rights of the group that 
benefitted from exclusionary property laws—seems difficult, if 
not uncomfortable, to articulate.
Part I of this article introduces modern post-colonial land 
reform and the idea of property as it relates to land reform by 
tracing both classical and customary theories of property. The 
Zimbabwe land reform platform, commenced in the late 1990s, 
presents a relatively recent example of policy-driven land redis-
tribution.14 Part II examines international law concerning prop-
erty and land rights to demonstrate that land reform is captured 
by the body of human rights law which addresses procedural 
rights—first-generation, or civil and political (“CP”) rights. Part 
III presents the confluence of CP rights principles, provisions on 
property in human rights, and judicial interpretations of the idea 
of property, which together establish the legal standard proposed 
here—the outer bounds of the power of sovereigns to reform 
property rights in land post-colonization.
Articulating the legal bounds of land redistribution is more 
critical today than it ever was.15 The legal standard proposed 
here is aimed at: (1) protecting the universal idea of property; 
(2) advancing the right and capacity of post-colonial govern-
ments to develop land as a natural resource; and: (3) providing a 
clear skeletal framework for legally and morally justifiable land 
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reform for those regions of the world contemplating wide-scale 
land transfer programs.
I. TheoreTIcal FoundaTIons For PosT-colonIal 
land reForm
Agrarian nations with a history of colonization are on the 
verge of imploding under the weight of unaddressed or poorly 
addressed needs for land reform.16 Land acquisition and redistri-
bution have received little attention from international scholars, 
and yet they arguably pose the most direct threat to develop-
ment for post-colonial States. In 2004, Ben Chigara framed the 
Southern Africa Development Cooperation (“SADC”) land con-
flict as an issue which threatens social, political and economic 
disintegration of some SADC member States and destabilization 
of the region as a whole.17 This need for careful resolution of 
post-colonial land issues is not unique to sub-Saharan Africa.18 
Latin America and Asia are also grappling with land reform 
issues.19 The justifications for land reform are primarily social, 
economic and political and include, inter alia: the need to right 
historical wrongs; the need to rationalize distortions in land rela-
tions, particularly in regards to tenure and distribution; the need 
to resolve internal conflicts arising from inefficiencies within the 
existing tenure relations; and the desire to “modernize” indig-
enous tenure as a means of stimulating agrarian development.20
The re-appropriation of land and the idea of property rights 
could not be more adverse to each other. Regardless of its neces-
sity, land redistribution stands in opposition to ideas rooted in 
classical theories of property and customary law, which, to vary-
ing degrees, conceptualize property as an individual or common 
right to own, hold or use land to the exclusion of all others.21 
Neither classical theories nor customary rights approaches to 
property anticipate the modern need to legitimately dispossess 
a land-wealthy few and transfer land to previously marginalized 
groups.
A variety of philosophical traditions guide scholars and 
judges in choosing a normative approach to what the rules of 
property law are and should be.22 Justice, liberty, or rights-
based approaches focus on the obligation to pursue fairness 
when selecting the applicable law in a given case.23 The justice 
approach arises from the notion that law should protect indi-
vidual rights.24 This approach to property focuses on individual 
autonomy, human dignity, human flourishing, distributive fair-
ness, social justice, human needs and other related norms.25 
Rights-based approaches to property propose that someone has 
an obligation to protect or preserve the property right.26 These 
approaches can be easily used to support a land redistribution 
program that simply orders total restitution, such as full dispos-
session of land-holders whose estates can be traced to colonial 
conquest. In this context of land reapportionment, who has the 
obligation to protect the right? Should the government pay for 
the land on behalf of the dispossessed, as was the case with the 
first major phase of land redistribution in Zimbabwe?27 Or does 
that obligation fall on another—perhaps the public at large?
A second approach to property is the utilitarian or con-
sequentialist approach, which creates rules of property based 
not on their inherent goodness or fairness, but on the societal 
consequences they produce.28 The goal of this strand of property 
theory is to promote the general welfare, maximize wealth, or 
increase social utility and efficiency.29 If the economic snapshot 
of Zimbabwe in the colonial 1970s is compared with the 2000s 
after the fast-track land reform program, the utilitarian theories 
produce the perverse result of suggesting that land should not 
have been redistributed at all.30 This theory would vest in the 
commercial farmer of European descent full rights to the land 
simply by virtue of the farmer being in the best position to put 
the land to beneficial use. However, establishing a property right 
to land for the beneficiaries of colonization simply because they 
had the wealth, capital and financial resources to engage in large-
scale commercial farming is to place the notion of property on 
shifting soil. How does one account for the fact that colonial 
law, such as the Land Tenure Act in Zimbabwe,31 excluded the 
indigenous from owning land, even if one had the wealth and 
knowledge to contribute to the agricultural output on a large 
scale?32 The utilitarian theory of property therefore fails to sup-
port a sensible legal standard without raising some insurmount-
able equity questions.
A few traditional theories of property law take a more direct 
approach to the idea of property by creating justificatory norms 
to ground the definition and allocation of property rights. Those 
most relevant to the theoretical foundations of land reform are: 
(1) first possession as a source of property rights—including 
conquest; (2) labor (desert); (3) personality and human flourish-
ing; (4) efficiency; (5) justified expectations; and (6) distributive 
justice. 33 The possession theory of the source protects possess-
ors from claims by anyone but the title holder, and in some cases 
even the title holder will not be able to dispossess a possessor.34 
Commonly held norms that justify the possession theory include 
protection of rights and efficiency maximization.35
Although these are attractive norms, possession in the con-
text of post-colonial land distribution is highly problematic.36 
Land in Zimbabwe was obtained by a combination of coerced 
agreements, force and/or conquest.37 Land allocation during 
colonial rule did not allow black Africans to make land claims. 
The Land Apportionment Act of 1931 strengthened the white 
settlers’ expropriation of land owned by indigenous people.38 
Under a system that designated land in terms of who lived on 
and farmed it, the legislation allocated approximately 51% of 
land to about 3,000 white farmers, confining 1.2 million indig-
enous Africans to Native Reserves that constituted 30% of the 
country’s poorest agricultural land.39 Indigenous Africans could 
not own land classified as “white” in the apartheid system estab-
lished by this and subsequent laws, and those who already owned 
or lived on designated lands were evicted en masse and relocated 
to Native Reserves.40 As evidenced by Zimbabwe’s experience, 
the distributive implications of the possession theory make it an 
insufficient theory on which to base the new allocation of land 
rights under a post-colonial redistribution program.
The property theory that comes closest to providing a 
sound theoretical foundation for property rights in the context 
of land redistribution is John Locke’s labor theory of property. 
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In his Second Treatise of Government, Locke posited: “As much 
land as man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the 
product of, so much is his property. He by his labor does, as it 
were, inclose [sic] it from the common.”41 Locke declared that 
“[w]hatsoever then [a person] removes out of the state that 
nature has provided and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, 
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes 
it his property.”42 This “mixing” of one’s labor with land cre-
ates Locke’s idea of property. Locke’s labor theory went on to 
explicitly constrain property rights by requiring that the person 
claiming property—by virtue of his labor “mixed” in with the 
land—not take so much of the land that others would be pro-
hibited from equally utilizing with the land.43 The conditions 
in post-colonial Africa, with its historical legal barriers to land 
access, meant that indigenous Africans did not have access to 
land of the same quality as settlers.44 Therefore, the natural rights 
theory provides a theoretical starting point for post-colonial land 
reform because it rejects the absoluteness of the other classical 
theories and refuses to allocate property rights on the basis of 
who has the better guns. To Locke, the post-colonial commercial 
farmers’ agrarian efforts, while establishing property rights in 
the land, are valid only to the extent that their exercise does not 
deny other individuals the opportunity to create for themselves 
the same type of property rights.45
While they are useful in framing the conceptual gap in 
property rights theory as applied to post-colonial land redistri-
bution, classical theories of property are further confounded by 
the historical dominance of the customary ideas of property in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. Under the customs and tradi-
tions of many countries that have undergone or are currently 
engaged in land redistribution, the idea of property, especially 
where applied to land, was largely communitarian.46 Land was 
owned by the entire community, with the existence of merely 
temporary claims.47 This system of communitarian holding pat-
terns established the “law” prior to colonization.48 Customary 
patterns of land tenure stand in stark contrast to the settlers’ idea 
of specifically identified, titled and exclusive land rights.
Customary land tenure still influences holding patterns 
today. For example, to many indigenous populations of Latin 
America, the territory is considered to be a communal posses-
sion of a distinct people or ethno-linguistic group.49 Customary 
norms stipulate that the territory is to be shared for the benefit 
of the community and prohibit alienation of the whole or any 
portion of it (no matter how small) to any individual, family, 
community or other association.50 Unlike the civil codes of 
many Latin American countries, which dictate that land owner-
ship rights derive exclusively from the social function of rural 
property, when put to agricultural use, indigenous customary 
laws view exclusive rights of possession flowing from use, 
occupancy, practical and spiritual knowledge, and the religious 
and spiritual ties to the land.51 In many indigenous societies, tra-
ditional territorial possession and rights to share in and benefit 
from a homeland are derived from an intimate collective and 
individual knowledge of the totality of a particular territory or a 
specific part of that territory.52
Although the model is extreme, Zimbabwe’s fast-track land 
reform program provides a recent canvas to articulate a legal 
standard. Basic principles of fairness suggest that those who 
possessed and maintained their commercial farming estates 
through a land-grab executed by their ancestors have no right in 
the property just as a thief has no property interest in the chattel 
of another by simply converting it. Natural notions of correc-
tive justice and restitution support the full return of land into 
the hands of the historically disenfranchised group, regardless of 
the moral or economic judgments we may make about economic 
viability of such an undertaking. Under traditional ideas of prop-
erty, we are left in a world of land reform triage—insufficient 
principles on which to base the otherwise indispensable need 
for land redistribution and little guidance on how to implement 
this invaluable undertaking while upholding the idea of property. 
This theoretical gap is unsustainable given the urgencies faced 
by post-colonial governments to resolve critical issues of land 
distribution. It demands that our post-modern legal order cre-
atively structure an adaptive legal standard for land reform.
Although international law is traditionally viewed as gov-
erning the relationship between sovereigns, and largely abstains 
from domestic issues such as individual property rights,53 an 
exploration of international law reveals a robust body of legal 
and moral norms fit for articulating such a standard. These legal 
and moral norms suggest that, in a land redistribution program, 
stripping land rights from any group, even when that group 
benefitted from a system weighted in its favor, conflicts with 
universal principles found in human rights law and in general 
principles of international law.54
II. Land RefoRm & RIghts undeR  
InteRnatIonaL Law
Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”) explicitly protects the right to property. It states:
(1)  Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as 
in association with others.
(2)  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.55
It has been posited that the UDHR’s human right to own 
property is not a right to specific pieces of property but a general 
right to hold adequate property.56 Land is fundamental to the 
attainment or protection of a variety of other basic human rights, 
such as the right to life.57 Therefore, although no international 
right to land is explicitly guaranteed in the international legal 
framework, there is an emerging international norm recognizing 
that a post-colonial government’s sovereign right to redistribute 
land violates an international moral code of property rights when 
it fails to recognize the five elements articulated herein.58
The (NoN-exisTeNT) humaN RighT To LaNd
The documents forming the pillars of human rights law 
all frame the concept of human rights in terms of human dig-
nity59 and acknowledge the human personality (as opposed 
to the rights of groups, or “peoples.”)60 Without this focus on 
individual rights, personhood unravels at the hands of domestic 
law and unbridled exercises of state sovereignty. Human rights 
principles operate to take unfettered power over individuals out 
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of the hands of States. Today, human rights concepts have crys-
tallized into law, creating binding obligations on governments 
despite the backdrop of Westphalia and ideas of sovereignty.61
Yet, human rights law represents ideals over which conflict-
ing groups will continue to struggle.62 On one hand, human 
rights activists and scholars push for a definition of human rights 
based on a broad and inclusive conception of what it means to 
be “human” and stress a wide range of moral claims to which 
humans are entitled.63 On the other hand, states, groups, and 
individuals who are resistant to a progressive human rights 
agenda commonly define humanity in more narrow and lim-
ited ways.64 Legal distinctions are made between fundamental 
human rights and other rights, with fundamental rights being 
perceived as elementary or supra-positive in that their validity 
is not dependent on their acceptance by the subjects of law.65 
These fundamental rights are seen as the foundation of the inter-
national community.66 Consequently, the right to own a piece of 
land is not classified as a fundamental human right. However, 
the international norms protecting human dignity underscore 
the existence of a legal standard for the preservation of property 
rights under post-colonial land reform. At the heart of these 
norms is procedural due process.
Procedure under civil & Political rights & norms
The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) embody the so-called first 
generation and second generation human rights, respectively.67 
A brief overview of the evolutionary classes of human rights 
reveals that first generation, or civil and political (“CP”), rights 
require governments adopting a policy of post-colonial land 
redistribution to extend broad procedural protections to the 
group whose land is indentified for annexation.
The ICCPR governs the protection of the human interest 
in bodily integrity, self-determination and human dignity.68 The 
enumerated rights under the ICCPR each stem from the idea 
of due process of law.69 Due process is perceived as playing a 
significant role in fulfilling the universal need for human dignity. 
Access to enumerated protection and procedure can be afforded 
all human beings with less intrusion on the sovereignty of states 
than a substantive obligation would impose.70 Therefore, like the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR presumes 
the universal applicability of the norms it articulates.71 The 
body of CP rights envisages a system in which individuals are 
accorded specific minimal procedural protections in the deter-
mination of their legal entitlements.72 It does not provide access 
to substantive entitlements. However, when those entitlements 
are re-ordered by government, the CP norms trigger the state’s 
duty to align the procedural mechanism employed to univer-
sal principles articulated in the spirit and letter of the ICCPR. 
Several of these CP rights are framed in absolute terms in the 
Covenant,73 which arises out of the fundamental nature of the 
protected rights. For example, Article 25 creates an obligation 
for states to provide every citizen the right and the opportunity, 
“without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and 
without unreasonable restrictions to take part in the conduct of 
public affairs, inter alia.”74
The ICESCR embodies second generation economic, social, 
and cultural rights that scholars have characterized as “program-
matic and promotional.”75 According to Anton and Shelton, 
despite the fact that within the U.N. there is an almost universal 
acceptance of the theoretical “indivisible and interdependent” 
nature of the two sets of human rights, the reality is that eco-
nomic, social, and cultural (“ESC”) rights are largely ignored.76 
The ESC body of international human rights differs in substance 
from CP rights and meets greater opposition from individual 
states because of its deeper interface with issues that, even in a 
world governed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
are traditionally seen as domestic prerogatives. For a flavor of 
the types of rights guaranteed under the ICESCR, see articles 
6,77 7,78 8,79 9,80 10,81 11,82 12,83 13,84 and 14.85
Specific rights to land as property have been left out of all 
major treaties. This is not surprising, given that land is such a 
central aspect of sovereignty that it is even part of the defini-
tion of the nation-state.86 Land law is generally an issue over 
which states exercise full territorial sovereignty.87 Nevertheless, 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR impose procedural and substantive 
minima, which states may not ignore in recognition of their 
obligations under international law. Specifically the ICCPR 
guarantees everyone, including holders of land seized under a 
land redistribution policy, the right to an effective remedy (even 
against state actors) the right to a judicial remedy, and the right 
of the individual to retain enough property for an adequate 
standard of living.88 Derogation from ICCPR obligations is per-
mitted under very narrow circumstances characterized by public 
emergency.89
Despite the fact that primary human rights instruments 
avoid directly addressing property rights, other sources of inter-
national law take the subject head-on, but only for the protection 
of narrowly defined groups. These international instruments are 
instructive in identifying the elements of a legal standard for land 
reform because they are an example of instances where inter-
national law reaches beyond the sovereign barrier to domestic 
land issues. Explicit rights to land have been developed in two 
areas of international human rights law: the rights of indigenous 
peoples and the rights of women.90 These instruments suggest a 
growing willingness of sovereign states to cede absolute control 
of at least some issues of property law and policy, and also point 
to the universal importance of both access and tenure.
exPlicitly recognized land rights
The International Labor Organization Convention 169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (“Convention 169”) is the only 
legally binding international instrument related to the rights of 
indigenous peoples.91 Convention 169 establishes the right of 
indigenous peoples to “exercise control, to the extent possible, 
over their own economic, social and cultural development” in 
a number of areas.92 It includes specific sections on land and 
requires parties to identify lands traditionally occupied by 
indigenous peoples and guarantees ownership and protection of 
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rights thereon.93 In essence, “measures shall be taken in appro-
priate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to 
use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they 
have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional 
activities.”94 Convention 169 also requires the provision of legal 
procedures to resolve land claims, establishes rights over natural 
resources, and protects against forced removal.95
A second explicit articulation of land rights was generated 
under the UN framework and garners much wider support than 
Convention 169, but it is not a legally binding instrument.96 
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(“UNDRIP”) states that “indigenous peoples have the right to 
the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally 
owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.”97 Indigenous 
people have a right to own and develop resources on their land, 
a “right to redress . . . for the lands, territories and resources 
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or 
used and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used 
or damaged.”98 The Declaration confirms similar principles to 
those contained in Convention 169. Both the Convention and 
the Declaration emphasize consultation, participation and free, 
prior, and informed consent where government policy affects 
lands occupied by indigenous peoples.99
Implicit in both Convention 168 and UNDRIP is the underly-
ing notion that human rights law limits the type of policies a gov-
ernment may use to redefine land rights. The narrow application 
of these articulations exposes the fact that the power imbalance 
between government and individuals (or groups) has historically 
disadvantaged the poor and displaced people with deep histori-
cal connections to the geographic location from which they are 
expelled. Modern examples of government altering the idea of 
property through land reform call for the same body of law to 
prevent excessive, dehumanizing land reform policies. While it 
can be agreed that land rights are not in themselves human rights 
as they lack the inalienability of self-determination or the fun-
damental nature of bodily integrity, human rights norms provide 
the core elements of a new property right under post-colonial 
land reform.
The Idea of ProPerTy In human rIghTs JurIsPrudence
On May 27, 2002, the African Commission on Human 
Rights and Peoples’ Rights (“African Commission”) became 
the first human rights adjudicatory organ to find the existence 
of a sweeping “human right to a healthy environment.”100 By 
broadly interpreting Article 24 of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”) in SERAC v. Nigeria, 
the Commission seemed to herald a new era in the liberalization 
of human rights.101 It has been described as a sweeping deci-
sion affirming the duties of African states to ensure respect for 
economic, social and cultural rights.102 At the time that SERAC 
v. Nigeria was decided, there was much optimism that the deci-
sion offered a “blueprint for merging environmental protection, 
economic development, and guarantee of human rights.”103 But 
most importantly, the African Commission’s SERAC decision 
suggested a liberal interpretation of the rights protected under 
the African Charter, opening the door to the possibility of cloth-
ing other rights under the charter with broad protection under 
regional and international law. Article 14 of the same Charter 
directly protects a human right to property, except under very 
specific circumstances.104
The African Commission on Human Rights has spoken 
consistently in two cases invoking land interests in the context 
of human rights, but not in the context of land redistribution.105 
Endorois v. Kenya is of paramount importance in understand-
ing how the severity of the conflict between human rights and 
public policies alter property rights in land. In that case, the 
African Commission ruled on a complaint filed by the Center 
for Minority Rights Development and others, on behalf of the 
Endorois community, an indigenous community of 60,000 
people living in the Lake Bogoria area.106 The complaint alleged 
that the Government of Kenya violated the African Charter, 
the Constitution of Kenya, and international law by forcibly 
removing the Endorois from their ancestral lands without prior 
consultation and without adequate or effective compensation.107 
The plaintiffs alleged that the displacement disrupted their 
community’s pastoral enterprise, interfering with their primary 
economic livelihood and preventing them from practicing their 
religion and culture.108 They sought a declaration by the African 
Commission that the Republic of Kenya violated Articles 8, 14, 
17, 21, and 22 of the African Charter.109 The plaintiffs demanded 
(1) restitution of their land, with legal title and clear demarca-
tion, and (2) compensation to the community for all the losses 
suffered through the loss of property, development and natural 
resources, as well as the loss of freedom to practice their religion 
and culture.110
The Kenyan government argued that the land on which the 
Endorois lived was designated as “Trust Land.”111 Further, under 
the Kenyan Constitution, Trust Lands could be alienated or set 
apart as government land for government or private purposes, 
extinguishing any interests previously vested in any tribe, group, 
family or individual under African customary law.112 The African 
Commission relied on its own jurisprudence and on international 
case law to resolve the conflict,113 condemning the conduct of 
the government, and finding that restricting the Endorois from 
free access to their territory fell below internationally recog-
nized norms.114
The African Commission pointed to Articles 26 and 27 
of the UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples to stress that 
indigenous peoples have a recognized claim of ownership, not 
just access, to ancestral lands under international law, even in 
the absence of official title deeds.115 The Commission held that 
the traditional possession of land by indigenous people has the 
equivalent effect as that of a state-granted, full property title and 
entitles them to demand official registration of property title.116
But the Commission did not base its decision solely on 
international laws pertaining to indigenous rights. Of specific 
import to the broader notion of property rights in the context of 
land reform is the Commission’s reliance on Articles 14 and 21 
of the Charter.117 Article 14 provides:
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The individual right to property shall be guaranteed. It 
may only be encroached upon in the interest of public 
need or in the general interest of the community and in 
accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.118
Article 21 provides:
All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and 
natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the 
exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a 
people be deprived of it.119
The Commission clarified that it is not the encroach-
ment itself that creates a violation of Article 14 of the African 
Charter.120 The right to property under Article 14 imposes an 
obligation on States to respect as well as to protect the right to 
property.121 The Commission applied a two prong test extracted 
from the language of the provision. Under Article 14, an 
encroachment can only be conducted: (1) in the interest of pub-
lic need or in the general interest of the community, and (2) in 
accordance with appropriate laws.122 The test laid out in Article 
14 is conjunctive, such that public need alone cannot define the 
policy.
The Commission declared that domestic law did not 
by itself prescribe the right to property.123 Accordingly, the 
Commission scrutinized the actions of the Kenyan govern-
ment in light of standards and principles of international law. 
Relying on the Saramaka124 case—a recent landmark ruling by 
the Inter-American Court for Human Rights regarding the right 
of tribal and indigenous people in the Americas to control the 
exploitation of natural resources in their territories—the African 
Commission explained that the provision “in accordance with 
the provisions of appropriate law” under the African right to 
property required inquiry into: (1) effective participation; (2) 
compensation; and (3) prior environmental and social impact 
assessment.125 Finding that the Kenyan government had failed 
to sufficiently accord any of the three elements to the Endorois 
expropriation, the Commission held that the Kenyan government 
was in violation of the Endorois’ right to property.126
The Commission also elaborated on the notion of “public 
interest,” stating that this part of the test is met with a much 
higher threshold in the case of encroachment of indigenous land 
as opposed to individual private property.127 The Commission 
found support for its position in General Comment No. 4 of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which 
states that “instances of forced eviction are prima facie incom-
patible with the requirements of the ICESC Covenant and can 
only be justified in the most exceptional circumstances, and in 
accordance with relevant principles of international law.”128 The 
clarity of the encroachment rule now positions us to extract from 
the corpus of international and regional human rights law those 
elements of the notion of property that must permeate any post-
colonial land redistribution policy.
III. Core elements of the land reform formula
Five legal principles can be extracted from the preceding 
discussion, which together form the minimum standards under 
international law for post-colonial land redistribution. These 
elements are universal principles linking the right to land (as 
property) to broader principles of international law. Under this 
legal standard, post-colonial land reform: (1) is based on the 
existence and articulation of a legitimate public emergency; (2) 
is authorized and carried out in accordance with both domes-
tic and international law; (3) exercises proportionality in its 
implementation; (4) provides a non-discriminatory right to own 
land under the new system; and (5) pays compensation at inde-
pendently determined market value whenever any of the other 
elements are breached. The following section explores these 
elements in depth.
ExistEncE and articulation of Public EmErgEncy 
crEating lEgitimacy
An indispensable component of the land reform formula 
is that government proceeds on the basis of a legitimate public 
need for land reform. Because land reform through expropria-
tion is an extreme measure confronting many civil and political 
rights, a land reform program can only be legal under interna-
tional law if conditions in the post-colonial states qualify as a 
public emergency which “threatens the life of the nation.”129
The land imbalance in Zimbabwe was stark enough to set 
aside debates on the necessity of land reform. Landlessness, 
especially where it is an insurmountable economic barrier in 
the absence of reform policy, can be considered a public emer-
gency.130 Therefore, when executed to avert urgent economic 
and social crises, land reform is designed to empower previ-
ously land-less people by giving them access to land, a primary 
natural resource and the hallmark of agrarian economies. Under 
this standard, governments have an obligation to articulate a 
legitimate public interest before any program of redistribution is 
implemented. Public need must threaten the economic or social 
well-being of the State before this condition is satisfied.
thE “in accordancE with thE law” tEst
A land reform program which adheres to principles of inter-
national law is designed and implemented with respect for the 
rule of law.131 In Endorois v. Kenya, the African Commission 
emphasized the conjunctive nature of the inquiry into whether 
the human right to property had been violated.132 The African 
Commission explained that under this analysis, the disposses-
sion of land must satisfy both domestic and international law.133
That the African right to property in Endorois was supported 
by the ruling of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
Saramaka bolsters the universal reach of the notion that land 
expropriation must be designed and implemented in accordance 
with international norms concerning effective participation, 
compensation, and prior environmental and social impact 
assessment.134 In the absence of these formal mechanisms, the 
substance of rule of law is lost. In essence, land reform may be 
governed entirely by domestic laws as long as that law embod-
ies the three core elements that human rights precedent agrees 
enshrine lawful expropriation.135
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ProPortionality & the least restrictive Policy
Both African and European jurisprudence restrict the range 
of permissible state conduct that interferes with the right to 
property. In addition to the requirements that government have 
a legitimate public purpose and that the expropriation be carried 
out in accordance with appropriate domestic and international 
law, Endorois held that limitations placed by government on the 
human right to property must be reviewed under the principle 
of proportionality.136 Under this requirement, limitations on 
rights to property must be proportionate to a legitimate need, and 
should be the least restrictive measures possible.137 Expanding 
the discussion from indigenous peoples, the Commission cited 
its decision in Constitutional Rights Project Case 1999: “the jus-
tification of limitations must be strictly proportionate with, and 
absolutely necessary for, the advantages which follow.”138 The 
rule of proportionality declares that “a limitation may not erode 
a right such that the right itself becomes illusory,” and further, 
that eviction violates the very essence of the right.139 Putting 
these principles together, land reform policy may not include 
systematic eviction and must allow incumbent landholders to 
retain that portion of land that supports a family and allows them 
to be self-sufficient.
Further, the international norm of proportionality in the 
human rights context has been defined by the European Court 
of Human Rights to require that any condition or restriction 
imposed upon a right [under the European Convention on 
Human Rights] be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pur-
sued.”140 Although proportionality is most commonly identified 
under international law in the context of the use of force, propor-
tionality is also a central theme of international law concerning 
civil and political rights.141 The derogation clause illustrates this 
principle by restricting State actions that depart from protecting 
CP rights only to the “extent strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation.” 142 Under no set of hypothetical scenarios can 
physical violence and force be deemed a legally permissible 
platform for land expropriation, and where the appropriate laws 
and procedures are followed, resistance to expropriation should 
be treated through the justice system, where the appropriate civil 
and political rights would be protected.
eradication of discriminatory ProPerty right 
allocations
Citizens of the post-colonial country, barring other non-dis-
criminatory impediments, should be given equal opportunity to 
own land under the new system. Conceptual loopholes in exist-
ing human rights law expose those subject to land annexation to 
discriminatory treatment. Yet a land reform policy that excludes 
certain groups from obtaining title to land or enjoying the same 
types of property rights available to the direct beneficiaries of 
the reform simply perpetuates systems of disenfranchisement 
and violates the anti-discrimination principles of the ICCPR, 
the ICESCR, and other treaties which collectively form a clear 
universal norm against discrimination.143
The victory of the Endorois under the African regional 
human rights system is a reinforcement of the focus of land rights 
on the poor to the exclusion of the rich. Yet, human rights are not 
just for the poor, nor for the rich—their goal is the preservation 
of all human dignity.144 We misconstrue the idea of human rights 
when we sentimentalize the land rights of ‘the poor’ or the dis-
enfranchised in parts of the world like Lake Bogoria in Kenya, 
while recoiling from the idea of preserving property rights for 
people who benefitted from colonization.145
comPensation Where elements are Breached
The notion of compensation for injury is well established 
under international law, but ideas about its role in land redis-
tribution are less convergent.146 Having determined that the 
Endorois owned the land and thus had a protected ownership 
right under international and African human rights law and 
under general principles of international law, the Commission 
proceeded to determine the remedy. Article 14 provides that in 
the case of dispossession the victims have the right to the lawful 
recovery of their property as well as adequate compensation.147 
The Commission held that Endorois who had been forced off the 
land were entitled to either restitution or to obtain other lands of 
equal extent and quality.148
From a practical standpoint, land redistribution is unlikely to 
be attainable on the scale required for land reform if it demands 
compensation at market value for all land acquired for redistribu-
tion. But there is also a legal dimension: the ICCPR derogation 
clause suggests that such compensation is not mandated under 
international law.149 Under civil and political rights principles, if 
a public need for land reform rises to the level of threatening the 
life of a nation, the notion of compensation at market value does 
not stand in the way of a State’s power, indeed its obligation, to 
address land pressure. Instead, compensation should be viewed 
as a penalty government must pay to incumbent landowners if 
its land reform policy breaches any of the preceding four proce-
dural and substantive elements.
ConClusion
Land reform has become too critical an issue to ignore in 
post-colonial countries, and the power of governments to alter 
property rights consistent with international law is a critical 
question of our day. This article proposes a legal standard for 
post-colonial land reform, one rooted in human rights law and 
framed in the language of norms that go beyond the racial and 
socio-economic tension accompanying current post-colonial 
land reform efforts.
The legal standard for land reform proposed here demon-
strates that human rights can co-exist with the recognition of the 
need for land redistribution to correct the land ownership imbal-
ances that remain an unresolved, simmering issue of contention. 
The land right is not synonymous with the basic human right, 
because the need for land lacks the characteristic universality of 
fundamental human rights. Rather, the land right that is protected 
under international law, within the complicated framework of 
post-colonial land redistribution, is the right of the incumbent 
to retain enough land for his subsistence and that of his family. 
This is the substantive portion of the notion of property in the land 
reform context. Further, for annexation and redistribution to be 
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lawful under international law, the policy must: (1) be based on the 
existence and articulation of a legitimate public emergency; (2) be 
authorized and carried out in accordance with both domestic and 
international law; (3) exercise proportionality in its implementa-
tion; (4) provide a non-discriminatory right to own land under 
the new system; and (5) pay compensation at an independently 
determined market value where the other elements are breached.
Classical theories and customary practices defining the 
concept of property are ill-suited to the modern-day need to 
justify and implement land redistribution. The clash between 
the dominant theories upon which property law is founded and 
the transfer of land by government from the land-wealthy to 
the landless requires a new, comprehensive way of looking at 
property—one that is founded on universal principles that apply 
to individuals and groups regardless of their race or status. In a 
world where many post-colonial governments are grappling with 
serious issues of land pressure, the absence of definitive inter-
national law on land reform is untenable. This proposed legal 
standard for land reform defends a substantive and procedural 
minimum that post-colonial governments, in their rightful asser-
tions of sovereignty, should incorporate in formulating much-
needed land redistribution.
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